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ARGUMENT 
A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE DOES 
NOT ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO LIEN ABUTTING LOTS FOR WORK 
PERFORMED ON PUBLIC ROADS. 
1. The Plain Language of Utah Code Section 38-1-1 Precludes Appellee's 
Lien Claim. 
Appellee, much like the district court, fails to take into consideration the plain 
language of section 38-1-1. Instead, Appellee begs the Court to look beyond the plain 
language of the statute to find provisions that simply aren't there. This is an incorrect 
method of statutory interpretation. In Garrardv. Gateway Financial Services, Inc., 2009 UT 
22,207 P.3d 1227, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the plain language of the Utah Unfair 
Practices Act. Reviewing the phrasing and specific language contained in the statute, the 
Court found that the Legislature's intent was unambiguous. Id. at f^ 11. The Court quoted 
the familiar rule that "'[wjhere the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court 
will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent. Rather, we are guided by the rule 
that a statute should generally be construed according to its plain language.'" Id., quoting 
Brinkerhoffv. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989). Because of this rule, the Court went 
on to refuse to "look to the language of the other Acts under the same title, such as the 
Consumer Sales Practices Act, or administrative rules adopted pursuant to these additional 
Acts to interpret the plain language of the Unfair Practices Act." Id. Thus, as the Court 
reiterated, when the plain language of a statute evinces its meaning, the Court looks no 
4 
further. See also Trench Shoring Services, Inc. v. Saratoga Springs Development, L.L.C., 
2002 Ut App 300, f 10 (statute must be interpreted according to its literal wording unless it 
is "unreasonably confused or inoperable."). 
Appellee concedes that "the plain reading of the statute, without adding to it, is that 
the mechanic's lien statutes do not apply to the public improvement, itself" Appellee's 
Brief, p. 25. Appellee posits that the language only prohibits a mechanic from attempting 
to enforce a lien against the real property upon which the public improvement lies. Id. Thus, 
Appellee urges, its lien can be enforced against other properties that benefit from the public 
improvement that it worked on. Id. In fact, as Appellee itself points out, the plain language 
of section 38-1-1 does not mention when a public improvement adds benefits to private 
property, nor does it mention what happens when the construction of a public improvement 
involves private entities or private projects. But contrary to Appellee's argument, the absence 
of those situations from the language of the statute does not mean that a mechanics lien can 
be filed and enforced in those types of situations. Instead, the plain language states that the 
Mechanics Lien Statute does not apply at all See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1. 
Under the plain terms of section 38-1-1, no provision of the Mechanic's Lien Statute 
applies to a "public improvement." The statute says, "The provisions of this chapter shall not 
apply to any public building, structure or improvement." The work at issue was the paving 
of public, dedicated roads. Dedication of the roads vested fee title of those roads to Iron 
County. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-607(l). The fact that the county owns them makes 
5 
any itilprovemeiit on the dedicated roads a "public improvement." See Black's Law Diet., 
Deluxe Eighth Ed., p. 773 (defining a "public improv r ut" as "an •: = movement made to 
property owned by the state or any other political entity, such as a municipality"); see also 
Western Lion Ltd. v. City ofMattoonf 462 N.E.2d 891,894 (111. App. 1984) ("the term 'public 
improvement' is generally understood to mean any permanent improvement upon real 
property owned by the municipality") (citations omitted); Ward v. Salt Lake City, 151 P. 905, 
907 (Utah 1915) (including in its description of "public improvements" the "paving and 
guttering of streets and in constructing sidewalks and cross-walks"); Utah Code Ann. §17-
27a-306(3)(g)(ii)(c) (streets are a "public improvement"); White v. Salt Lake City, 239 P.2d 
210, 213-14 (Utah 1952) ("[W]hatever the nature of the title of the [pi ibli( • entitj ] in sti eets 
and alleys...it is such as to enable the public authorities to devote them to public purposes"); 
Bennettv. Bow Valley Dev. Corp., 797P.2d419,422 (Utah 1990); Utah Code Ann. § 63H-1-
102(17); Happoldt v. Kutscher, 567 S.E.2d 380, n.6 (Ga. App. 2002) ("a road is a public 
improvement"). By the clear terms of section 38-1-1, a lien is simply not a/v ailable foi 
Appellee's improvements of these public roads - whether Appellee seeks to enforce its 
purported lien against the roads themselves or against land abutting the roads is irrelevant, 
because the statute si ales (hal the provisions ol'fiic Meduiiiit/'s I ini Statute "shall not apply." 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1. 
By asking this Court to determine that work on a public improvement can be enforced 
against otlier properties that benefit from the public improvement simply because the work 
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was performed pursuant to a private contract, Appellee requests that this Court look beyond 
the statute to include within its definition something that simply is not there. That is what 
the district court did. Despite acknowledging that "the work here was technically performed 
on public property," Mem Dec. and Opinion, p. 9, the district court determined that section 
38-1-1 did not prevent Appellee's lien because "no lien has been filed on any public 
property", id., and the work was performed pursuant to a private contract rather than a public 
contract. See id., pp. 8-9. 
This expansive interpretation of section 38-1-1 violates the requirement that a court 
construe a statute according to its plain language. See DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 
P.2d 835, 843-44 (Utah 1996); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 
1989)); Trench Shoring Services, Inc. v. Saratoga Springs Development, L.L.C, 2002 UT 
App 300, f 10, 57 P.3d 241. In order to affirm the district court and satisfy Appellee's 
interpretative demand, this Court would have to rewrite section 38-1-1. This would be 
improper. See Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1995) (court has no power to rewrite 
a statute); Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 754 P.2d 672, 676 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). Section 38-1-1 says nothing about an exception for liens against abutting 
property in the event that the underlying contract for the public improvement is with a private 
entity. Indeed, it says nothing about public contracts at all. All it says is, "[t]he provisions 
of this chapter shall not apply to any public building, structure or improvement." Accord-
ingly, the district court erred in its interpretation of section 38-1-1 when it held that, despite 
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the terms of the statute, work performed on public property was lienable (against adjacent 
lots that allegedly benefitted from the public improvement) because the work was performed 
pursuant to a private contract. See Mem. Dec, p. 8. 
Arguing on appeal that a "public improvement" must actively involve a "govern-
mental entity having authority over the public property," Appellee's Brief, p. 19, Appellee 
offers no legal authoi 'is statement The same is true foi Appellee's unsupported 
assertion that a "public improvement" must include "[p]ublic funds." Id. Though Appellee 
looks to a treatise, McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, for assistance in the 
definition of a "public improvement," these assertions are also not included therein. Indeed, 
McQuil - learly acknowledges that paving of streets is, in fact, a "puhlu improvement." 
See 13 Eugene McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations, §§ 37.2, p. 17-18; 37.16, p. 
80 (3d ed. 1997). In any event, these assertions are contrary to the generally accepted 
definition of "public improvement", as well as the Utah judicial and legislative definitions 
set forth above. 
Appellee also cites to McQuillin for the proposition that 
in the case of a public improvement, since it would be 
intolerable that public property should be encumbered with liens 
in favor of contractors and others, it is provided that the lien 
shall attach to the moneys in the hands of the municipality set 
apart or appropriated for the payment of the sums to become due 
upon contract for the improvement.... 
Id., p. 20 (quoting 13 Eugene McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 37.195 (3d 
ed. 1QQ7A This quotation has no bearing on whether paving of a public road is a "public 
8 
improvement"; as set forth above, work performed on a public road meets the legal definition 
of a "public improvement," and conforms with Utah case law and statutory authority. 
Moreover, this quotation only proves Appellant's point - there is no availability of a lien in 
the current situation. Appellee could have easily required that a bond be posted to protect 
itself; it is lamentable that it did not and also that (as Appellee notes) Iron County did not 
post one. But the absence of a bond in this case does not in some way alter or negate the 
clear terms of the Mechanic's Lien Statute. 
Because the work at issue was a "public improvement," there is no room for further 
interpretation.1 Accordingly, the district court erred when it determined that, despite the 
language of section 38-1-1, Appellee could enforce its lien against property that benefitted 
from the public improvement. Appellant urges this Court to reverse the district court and 
rule that, under the clear terms of section 38-1-1, Appellee's lien is simply not available. 
2. Section 38-1-3 Does Not Allow Appellee to Lien Abutting Lots For Paving 
Work Performed on Public Roads. 
Section 38-1-3 states that a person "shall have a lien upon the property upon or 
concerning which they have rendered service..." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3. Appellee 
acknowledges that the first part of this sentence does not apply because Appellee did not 
Appellee raises an additional, one-paragraph argument at pp. 26-27 of Appellee's Brief 
regarding purported work performed outside the dedication plat. The district court determined 
that this was immaterial, particularly because the plat would have been amended (and the roads 
thus still dedicated to the public) after the improvements were made. See Memorandum 
Decision and Order, p. 18, n.l 1. As this was not the subject of a cross-appeal, Appellee's 
argument in this regard should not be considered on appeal. 
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perfoini work "upon the property" it seeks to enforce its lien, instead, Appellee continues 
to argue that it is entitled to rely on the "concerning which'1 portion of the statute. The district 
court made this same determination. However, this analysis has twice been rejected by this 
Court. Accordingly, reversal is appropriate. 
Decades ago, this Court determined that this portion of the statute deals with two 
classes of workers: work done by "contractors or laborers" such ,is Appellee, whose work 
must be "done upon the property," and services provided by "architects and engineers" and 
the like, whose work "may be regarded as done 'with respect to' or 'concerning' the 
property." Zions First Nat Bank v. Carlson, 464 w 387, 388-89 (Utah 1970) (quoting 
Stanton Trans. Co. v. Davis, 341 P.2d207,210 (uian 1959)) (emphasis added). Hie p]irase 
"concerning the property" was thus held to relate only to particular artisans whose work by 
its very nature is not performed "upon" the property. 
Though the legislature altered the language of other portions of this statute over the 
years, it left intact the provision that a person "shall have a liei i i lp :>n tl le pi opei t) i ipoi i or 
concerning which they have rendered service...". Had the legislature disagreed with this 
Court's interpretations in Carlson and Stanton, it could easily have altered such language. 
It did not do so. I lad the legislatu1 •* *x •- ^-'d to eviscerate the requirement that work such as 
paving be performed "upon" the property to be liened, it could have done so Indeed, fhe 
legislature could simply have changed the language to read that all work that simply 
"benefits" property in any way is lienable against that property. Again, the legislature did 
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not do so, and instead kept the precise language relied upon by this Court in Carlson and 
Stanton. By failing to change this critical portion of the statute, the legislature has implicitly 
endorsed this Court's prior rulings on the subject. See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, f 
25,158 P.3d 53; Theurer v. Board of Review, Indus. Com'n of Utah, Dept. of Employment 
Sec, 725 P.2d 1338, 1342 (Utah 1986). 
Appellee struggles to show that the district court did not err when it ruled that Carlson 
and Stanton were distinguishable or that Appellee's work could somehow fit within the 
"concerning which" language reserved for artisans such as engineers and architects. Though 
Appellee mentions on more than one occasion that the designations provided in these cases 
were only "examples," see Appellee's Brief, p. 30, it is unable to explain why its paving 
work could possibly fit with that category, and provides no legal authority for that 
proposition. To the contrary, it is clear that paving work performed on a road fits squarely 
within work done by "contractors or laborers." Because that work was not "done upon the 
property," Appellee is not entitled to lien abutting property for such work. 
Accordingly, the district court's determination that Appellee's work falls within the 
confines of section 38-1-3 is unfounded and should be reversed. 
B. FIRST OF DENVER MORT. INVESTORS V. ZUNDEL & ASSOC'S CANNOT 
SAVE APPELLEE'S LIEN CLAIM AND IT SHOULD NOT BE EXPANDED 
TO DO SO. 
1. The District Court Misapplied this Court's Ruling in First of Denver. 
11 
This Court's ruling in First of Denver Mortgage In vestors v. Zundel & Associates, 600 
P.2d 521 (Utah 1979) cannot save Appellee's claim. That decision made two separate deter-
minations: (1) that a water system installed in a subdivision was lienable because it was 
necessary to make the subdivision residences habitable; and (2) that work could relate back 
to prior work on the property for purposes of priority. Id. at 525-26. The first holding is not 
dispositive of the issue presented here. And the second holding regarding priority of the lien 
in that case is wholly irrelevant - the question here is whether Appellee's work, which was 
not necessary to make any residences within the subdivision habitable, is lienable at all. 
In regard to the particular issue of whether certain work was lienable under section 
38-1-3, this Court held as follows: 
It is not necessary to the attachment of a mechanics' lien that the 
material or labor be furnished solely on a building structure or 
that the work be performed solely on the lot on which a building 
is being erected. We agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
which stated in J. R. Christ Construction Co. v. Willete Assocs., 
47 N.J. 473, 221 A.2d 538 (1966), that a contractor should not 
be barred from enjoying the benefits of the mechanics' lien 
statute where his work not only enhances the value of the 
developer's land, but is also necessary to make residences to be 
built on such property habitable. 
First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel & Associates, 600 P.2d at 525 (emphasis 
added). Thus, to find that the work was lienable, this Court required both a showing of 
enhancement and that the improvement was necessary to make the property habitable. To 
date, this showing has not been made in the instant matter. 
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In its application of First of Denver, the district court relied entirely on the 
enhancement aspect of that case. The district court recognized that the paving work at issue 
was "not, like water and sewer systems, which are 'necessary to make residences to be built 
on [the] property habitable.'" Mem. Dec, p. 18 (quoting First of Denver, 600 P.2d at 525). 
Nevertheless, the district court held that the ruling or rationale of First of Denver should 
apply and render Appellee's work lienable because it determined that paving was "'essential 
to the comfortable and convenient use of [the property].'" Id., p. 20 (quoting First of Denver, 
600 P.2d at 525). This is insufficient under First of Denver. Effectively, the district court 
further expanded Utah's lien laws by redefining what work and property may be liened. 
Appellee is unable to provide any legal justification for this expansive interpretation, but 
argues that its work "certainly provided some measure of benefit to each of the residential 
lots to which access was made easier, more comfortable, and more convenient." Appellee's 
Brief, p. 46. This is simply not enough under section 38-1-3 nor under First of Denver? 
As set forth above, had the legislature intended that any work that simply enhances 
or benefits real property is lienable, it could have altered the statute to reflect that intent. In 
First of Denver, this Court held that work that "enhances" property and is "necessary" to 
make that property "habitable" is sufficient to come under the statute. To further alter that 
2
 Appellee spends much of its argument relating to First of Denver discussing 
priority and forseeability, see Appellee's Brief, pp. 36-38. These issues have no bearing 
on whether work is lienable in the first instance under Utah Code section 38-1-3 nor 
under the applicable part of this Court's holding in First of Denver . 
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requirement to allow entitlement to a lien for any work that simply benefits any property 
would go too far. This Court rejected a similar argument in Stanton Trans. Co. v. Davis, 
supra. The property there was improved by the drilling of an oil well. Id. at 208. Delivery 
of the oil rig to accomplish the drilling obviously benefitted the property, as the actual 
drilling would not have otherwise been possible. But this Court, based on the language of 
the statute, rejected the transport company's effort to rely on the mechanics lien statute. 
"While it is true that our statutes are to be liberally construed to give effect to their purpose 
and to promote justice, it is equally true that they should not be distorted beyond the intent 
of the legislature." Id. at 189. To expand the lien laws to cover property that is simply 
benefitted by labor or materials, as the district court did in the instant matter, would ignore 
and eviscerate the requirement that work by a contractor or a laborer be performed "upon" 
the property. The legislature has determined, and this Court has clarified, that such work 
must be performed "upon" property in order to entitle someone to a lien on that property. 
"Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the 
same to divine legislative intent. Rather, we are guided by the rule that a statute should 
generally be construed according to its plain language." Garrard v. Gateway Financial 
Services, Inc., supraf f 11 (quoting Brinkerhoffv. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989)). 
The statute, as written, is clear, and prevents arbitrary or uncertain application of its 
provisions. 
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2. To the Extent the District Court Relied on its Belief that the Roads at 
Issue Were Mere ATV Trails Before Appellee Paved Them, the District 
Court Erred, 
Appellant voiced its concern in its opening brief that the district court may have relied 
on incorrect facts when it ruled that First of Denver in some way authorized a determination 
that Appellee was entitled to lien abutting lots. In particular, Appellant showed that the 
district court erred when it determined that it was undisputed that "the roads paved by 
Plaintiff were, prior to such paving, 'accessible only by foot, on horse, ATV, or four wheel 
drive truck." Mem. Dec, p. 20 (R.996). Appellant demonstrated that, based on Appellee's 
own allegations and evidentiary submissions, that this factual finding had no evidentiary 
basis, and was improper. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 24-25, referencing, e.g., Appellee's 
memorandum supporting its cross motion, p. 5, f 2, and the Exhibits described therein 
(describing in detail the road improvements such as excavation and grading performed by 
R&W Excavating before Appellee paved the roads) (R.641); Barnhart Affidavit, ^ 14,15 
(Exhibit 3 to Mem. in Supp. of Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Sum. Judg. and in Opp. to 
Kennedy Funding, Inc's Mot. for Sum. Judg.) (R.674-75) (describing the fact that, before any 
work was done on the property in August 2005, the roads were simply ATV trails, and then 
describing the pre-paving excavation and improvements performed in 2005 and 2006, and 
stating that the roads were "later paved" by Appellee in 2007). Thus, Appellant pointed out 
that, to the extent the district court believed that Appellee's paving work made the roads 
15 
accessible by more than just foot traffic, horseback, ATVs or four-wheel drive trucks, this 
was erroneous. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 24-25. 
Remarkably, in response to this, Appellee spends the first six pages of its argument 
trying to justify a factual contention it has never asserted and does not believe, i.e., that its 
paving work was necessary to make the roads accessible to vehicular traffic. Appellee's 
Brief, pp. 8-14. The best argument Appellee can muster is that "the trial court's phrasing is 
not inaccurate. "Trior to' [Appellee's] paving, the roads were in fact accessible only by foot, 
horse, ATV or four wheel drive. The trial court did not say 'immediately prior to' as 
[Appellant] suggests." Appellee's Brief, p. 9. This is unconvincing - no one asserted below 
that anyone except Appellee did any paving, or that paving could somehow take place before 
the roads were actually excavated and graded. Appellee's own witnesses testified they could 
drive on those roads before they were paved. Deposition of Ronald Larsen, pp. 58,147 (id., 
Exhibit L) (R.745-46); Deposition of Daren Cottam, pp. 40-41 (id., Exhibit M) (R.749-50); 
see also Shrope Depo., pp. 58-59 (R.735-36). Accordingly, the district court's factual 
determination was incorrect and improper. See Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 
1097,1100 (Utah 1995); Territorial Savings & Loan Ass n v. Baird, 781 P.2d452,456 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). To the extent the district court determined that the holding in First of 
Denver somehow applied because of this unsupported factual finding, the district court erred. 
Similarly, there was no foundation for the district court's second factual determina-
tion, that "[w]ithout the pavement, there was no possibility of the development working 
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financially." Mem. Dec, p. 20 (R.996). The affidavit on which it was based contained only 
an unfounded and conclusory opinion of a construction manager regarding the financial 
expectations of an owner and developer. See Affidavit of Steve Barnhart, \1 (Exhibit 3 to 
Appellee's Mem. (R.637)). Appellee sets forth no meaningful challenge to this objection, and 
can only assert the fact that the declarant was an "affiliate" of the developer. Not once in 
Appellee's three-page argument is there any evidence that the declarant had any actual 
knowledge upon which to base the conclusory statement. See Appellee's Brief, pp. 15-17. 
Regardless of the evidentiary basis for this assertion, it is irrelevant and should not 
have been relied upon by the district court in its determination whether First of Denver 
applied to this case. As set forth above, the critical determinations under that case are 
whether a contractor's work "enhances the value of the developer's land" aad whether that 
work was "necessary to make residences to be built on such property habitable." First of 
Denver, 600 P.2d at 525. Whether or not a development will "work financially" has no 
bearing on this analysis. 
Accordingly, to the extent the district court relied on either of these factual findings 
for its conclusion that First of Denver applied to this case and allowed for Appellee's lien, 
the district court erred and its ruling should be reversed. 
3. The Authorities Provided By Appellant Below Show the Proper 
Determination Here is Reversal, 
Both Appellee and the district court gave too little, if any, credence to the extra-
territorial case law supplied by Appellant. Both Shelby Contracting Co,, Inc. v. Pizitz, 231 
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So.2d 743 (Ala. 1970) and Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. Sante Fe Land & Improvement 
Co., 332 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1958), are helpful with the analysis at issue here, to wit, whether 
work performed on public roads is lienable against abutting lots. Each of these cases deal 
with statutes similar to section 38-1-3, and each of these cases determined that abutting 
property was not lienable under such statutes. The district court failed to distinguish Brannan 
at all, and mistakenly held that Shelby was not applicable because section 38-1-3 does not 
require work to be "upon" the property liened. See Mem. Dec, p. 25 (R.1001). Appellee 
simply argues that these cases rely on different statutory language, but they do not. Each of 
these cases rely on and interpret a statute that requires that work be performed "upon" the 
property to be liened. The same is true here. Thus, Appellee is simply unable to provide a 
reason why the holdings in those cases should not be applied here. 
The language of section 38-1-3, and this Court's prior holdings in Stanton and 
Carlson, require that work by a contractor or laborer be performed upon property in order to 
lien that property. Accordingly, the cases cited by Appellant are apposite and provide further 
evidence that the district court erred when it ruled that Appellee could lien property upon 
which it did not perform the work at issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court and remand this 
matter with direction to grant Appellant's motion for summary judgment and dismiss 
Appellee's Amended Complaint as against Appellant. 
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DATED this/x^day of July, 2010. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
-Frank 
fe^fM. Strassberg 
Attorneys for Appellant Kennedy Funding, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
memorandum was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the />^ day of July, 2010, to the 
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912 West 1600 South, Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84771-2747 
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